by Ron Samson | Aug 30, 2026 | Compliance and Defense Industrial Base Security, SIEM and Log Management, Threat Detection and Response
EDR alert fatigue is an operating-model problem, not just a tooling problem Endpoint detection and response platforms are designed to surface suspicious behavior before it becomes a confirmed compromise. In practice, many security teams receive far more endpoint...
by Ron Samson | | Email Security, SOC as a Service, Threat Detection and Response
A Microsoft 365 takeover is a financial incident, not just an identity incident A business email compromise (BEC) event moves quickly because the attacker is already operating from a trusted identity. Once they control a Microsoft 365 mailbox, they can read invoice...
by Ron Samson | Aug 27, 2026 | Compliance and Defense Industrial Base Security, SIEM and Log Management, Threat Detection and Response
Why SIEM cost is an operating model decision A SIEM budget is rarely wrong because the platform quote was inaccurate. It fails because leaders price software while attackers, auditors, and executives expect a continuous operating capability. In 2026, the bill reflects...
by Ron Samson | Aug 26, 2026 | Compliance and Defense Industrial Base Security, Managed Security, Threat Detection and Response
The operational gap between owning Falcon and operating Falcon Buying CrowdStrike Falcon is often the easy decision. Operating it continuously is harder. A license delivers telemetry, prevention controls, detections, and powerful investigation capability; it does not...
by Ron Samson | Aug 24, 2026 | SIEM and Log Management, Threat Detection and Response
Third-Party Access Is a Business Requirement, Not an Exception Vendors need access to systems for legitimate reasons: maintaining production applications, supporting cloud platforms, processing payroll, servicing industrial equipment, reviewing financial records, or...
by Ron Samson | Aug 23, 2026 | Endpoint Security, Threat Detection and Response
The endpoint gap: prevention is not incident response Antivirus is necessary, but it cannot run an incident alone. A blocked file is useful, but it is not containment. Security leaders must determine whether adversaries established access elsewhere already. They need...
